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Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
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Binding: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 320.47304
EAN: 9780521669603
ISBN: 052166960X
Label: Cambridge University Press
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
Number Of Items: 1
Number Of Pages: 344
Publication Date: November 13, 1999
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Studio: Cambridge University Press
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Editorial Review:
In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.
In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.
Customer Reviews
Average Rating: 
Rating: - Already Classic Work Based on Incomplete Contracts Theory
This work is already a classic, and deservedly so. All the sections are excellent or almost excellent: the literature review is well presented, the theoretical model and the hypotheses are spelled out as clearly as one could wish, and the empirical tests are conducted accurately. In addition, from a pedagogical point of view, all steps are clearly defined and explained, including when game-theoretic and statistical issues are included. The results (chiefly, that when the same party controls the two ... Read More
Rating: - A Good transaction
Epstein and O'Halloran's work is a refreshing analysis of delegation under the separation of powers. Their formal analysis captures many aspects of recent research and combines them into a simple yet concrete theory. They have an extensive yet concise literature review and develop an empirical model that well demonstrates their theory. The only deficiency, and a small on at that, is their lack of analysis regarding the crafting of legislation and the politics involved. They note a decrease in delegation ... Read More
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